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Food Lion and the Media’s Liability for 
Newsgathering Torts:  A Symposium 
Preview 
Andrew B. Sims* 
 
It is widely held that, with regard to the First Amend-
ment,1 “crimes and torts committed in news gathering are 
not protected.”2  Nevertheless, much controversy has arisen 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Amherst 
College, B.A. 1970; Harvard University, J.D. 1973; Law Clerk, Hon. Charles D. 
Breitel, Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals, Albany, New York.  This Sym-
posium Preview briefly introduces some of the issues that are discussed in a 
panel discussion, Accountability of the Media in Investigations, as part of the Ford-
ham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal’s (“IPLJ”) Fifth An-
nual Symposium, Current Issues in Telecommunications and Media Law.  These is-
sues are developed in detail in an article by the author.  Andrew B. Sims, Food 
for the Lions:  The First Amendment and Excessive Media Liability for News-
gathering Torts (June 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the IPLJ).  The 
author would like to thank the editors of the IPLJ for inspiring this Symposium, 
his fellow Symposium participants, and his research assistant, Mara Taylor, for 
her assistance with this Symposium Preview. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment has been made applicable to 
the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
clause. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  Although the First 
Amendment only speaks to Congress and the federal government, and would 
have no application to the states or their subdivisions but for the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), courts and commenta-
tors freely refer to the First Amendment and rarely to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in free speech/free press cases involving action by the states.  A similar lib-
erty will be taken by the author in this Symposium Preview. 
It is generally accepted that state court enforcement of state common law or 
statutory tort laws would constitute the requisite state action to trigger the appli-
cability of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524 (1989); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 
(1977); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that defen-
dant’s tortious conduct was not immunized by First Amendment despite being 
committed during newsgathering process); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not afford a media defendant 
the right to conceal facts relevant to grand jury investigations of crimes or to 
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over the verdict in Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,3 in 
which a federal jury in North Carolina, on January 22, 1997, 
awarded $5.5 million in punitive damages against the media 
defendant for fraud, trespass, and breach of loyalty.  Such li-
ability arose because media defendant American Broadcast-
ing Company/Capital Cities (“ABC”) instructed its investi-
gators not to disclose their media connections in order to 
gain employment in plaintiff’s supermarket, and to surrepti-
tiously film alleged unsanitary meat-processing procedures.4  
Part of this film was aired nationally on defendant’s Prime-
Time Live program on November 5, 1992.5 
Fortunately for ABC, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled last year, in BMW of North America v. Gore,6 that exces-
                                                                                                                                  
conceal criminal conduct of sources); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-
50 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding media defendant liable for torts of invasion of privacy 
and intrusion in newsgathering process). 
3. For previously reported decisions in this case, see Food Lion v. Capital Cit-
ies/ABC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6962 (M.D.N.C. May 9, 1997) (memorandum opin-
ion) (giving rationale for decision excluding proof of publication damages fol-
lowing jury verdict finding defendants liable for fraud, trespass, and breach of 
duty of loyalty); 951 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (granting plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment on defendants’ affirmative defenses of unclean hands 
and in pari delicto); 951 F. Supp. 1224 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (denying defendants’ re-
newed motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of both breach of fiduciary duty and 
unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of North Carolina’s Unfair 
Trade Practices Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1996); 951 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D.N.C. 
1996) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on claims of fraud, 
trespass, negligent supervision, civil conspiracy, and respondeat superior for 
trespass); 887 F. Supp. 811 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (holding that state claims of fraud, 
trespass, and civil conspiracy did not warrant dismissal, that claims for viola-
tions of federal wiretapping statutes warranted dismissal, and claims for negli-
gent supervision, respondeat superior liability, breach of fiduciary duty and con-
structive fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, warranted deferment; that 
ABC’s acts did not constitute pattern of racketeering as required to establish 
RICO violation; and that plaintiff could not recover damages for injuries to its 
reputation as result of broadcast). 
4. For an excellent summary of the facts surrounding the Food Lion contro-
versy and the jury verdict, see Amy Singer, Food, Lies, and Videotape, AM. LAW., 
Apr. 1997, at 56. 
5. PrimeTime Live (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1992). 
6. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (holding that an award of $2 million in punitive 
damages for a distributor’s fraudulent failure to disclose the repainting of a new 
BMW automobile was “grossly excessive” and violated 14th Amendment due 
process guarantee). 
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sive punitive damages violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause.  In so holding, the Court posited a 
guidepost, in the form of a three-prong test, to determine 
whether a punitive damage award is unconstitutionally ex-
cessive under the Fourteenth Amendment.7  The test re-
quires courts to consider:  (1) the degree of reprehensibility 
of the defendant’s conduct;8 (2) the ratio of the punitive 
damage award to the compensatory damage award;9 and (3) 
the difference between the punitive damage award and the 
civil or criminal sanctions that could be imposed for compa-
rable conduct.10  On appeal,11 the Fourth Circuit is likely to 
overturn the punitive damage award against ABC in Food 
Lion and remand the decision for retrial,12 because the award 
is vulnerable under two, if not three, of the BMW guide-
posts.13 
Whether or not the media defendant’s conduct was “rep-
rehensible”—the first of the BMW guideposts or indicia14—is 
debatable,15 but the issue might well be resolved in ABC’s 
 
7. Id. at 1598. 
8. Id. at 1599. 
9. Id. at 1601. 
10. Id. at 1603. 
11. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. Food Lion, No. 96-2320 (4th Cir. argued May 
9, 1997). 
12. The Fourth Circuit could grant a remittitur of its own volition, offering 
Food Lion the option of accepting a specific reduction of its punitive damage 
award in lieu of a new trial. Cf. Martin v. Fleissner GmbH, 741 F.2d 61, 65 (4th 
Cir. 1984) (holding that an appellate remittitur might be granted as to an award 
of actual damages where the amount assessed “is ‘so shockingly excessive as 
manifestly to show that the jury was actuated by caprice, passion or prejudice’”) 
(quoting Hicks v. Herring, 144 S.E.2d 151, 154 (S.C. 1965)); see generally Eric 
Schnapper, Judges Against Juries—Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 
1989 WISC. L. REV. 237 (1989); Irene D. Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Fed-
eral Courts:  An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157, 
197 n.113 (1987). 
13. See Marcia Coyle, BMW Punies Ruling May Upend Food Lion Verdict, 
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at A9; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Smashing Undercover Journalism, 
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 17, 1997, at 23. 
14. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1599. 
15. The jury may have found the defendants’ behavior to have been “repre-
hensible” because of submitted evidence that the ABC reporters might have 
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favor if consideration of its newsgathering function and 
purpose, along with the First Amendment interests inherent 
therein, are taken into account.  The second indicium—the 
“disproportionality” of the punitive damage award16—is 
staggering.  The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
in Food Lion is nearly 4,000:1,17 compared to a ratio of only 
500:1, deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate in 
BMW.18  The third indicium—the “excessiveness” of the 
damages—is evaluated by measuring the difference between 
the punitive damage award and the civil or criminal sanc-
tions that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.19  
There is no North Carolina criminal statute leveling a fine of 
$5.5 million for fraud in an employment application,20 nor 
have there been comparable recoveries for compensatory 
damages in civil cases.21  Violation of North Carolina’s Un-
fair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”),22 with which the Food 
                                                                                                                                  
“staged” various incidents for the purpose of making Food Lion’s working con-
ditions look unsanitary, including, inter alia, failing to throw away rotten food, 
failing to clean a meat saw, and even “sabotaging” a hot water heater needed for 
equipment cleaning. See Food Lion, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6962, at *19-21.  Notably, 
however, Judge Tilley ruled that none of the alleged “staged incidents” could, 
under North Carolina or South Carolina law, be deemed to be the proximate 
cause of the $5.5 billion “publication  damages” that Food Lion alleged. Id. at *21-
31; see generally Food Lion, Fraud and Free Speech, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 
17, 1997 (Counsel Connect Round Table). 
16. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1601. 
17. Compensatory damages in Food Lion were $1,402 and punitive damages 
were $2 million.  See Singer, supra note 4, at 56. 
18. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1602-03. 
19. Id. at 1603. 
20. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-100 (1996) (making it illegal to obtain property 
by false pretenses and “punished by no less than 4 months nor more than 10 
years, and fined, in the discretion of the court”). 
21. Cf. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West Supp. 1996) (permitting the United States 
government to sue a federal employee, who obtained his or her employment by 
way of fraud on an employment application, for recovery of a forfeiture of be-
tween $5,000 and $10,000; and also treble damages, with “damages” possibly 
based on restitution of salary paid); see, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 138 F. 
Supp. 525 (W.D. Okla. 1956) (federal government claim for damages under the 
predecessor False Claims Statute, 31 U.S.C.A. § 231 (West Supp. 1996)). 
22. N.C. GEN. STAT.  §§ 75-1.1 to -16.2 (1996). 
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Lion defendants are charged,23 would only provide for an 
automatic trebling of the actual damage award.24 
If it is likely that the Fourth Circuit will reverse or reduce 
Food Lion’s punative damage award, Food Lion nevertheless 
raises the controversial issue of whether the media should be 
entitled to some First Amendment immunity, at least as to 
excessive punitive damage awards, if not as to liability for 
some newsgathering torts.25  While ABC would be gratified 
to see its Food Lion punitive damages reduced under the 
BMW principles,26 what the media giant would undoubtedly 
much prefer is judicial recognition of a First Amendment 
privilege to engage in minor, non-criminal newsgathering 
torts either without legal liability, or at least without the as-
sessment of any punitive damages if the tort-generated 
speech is truthful, of public concern, and is not legally con-
tested as being otherwise in defamation actions.27 
Media defendants like ABC, who want explicit recogni-
tion of such a First Amendment immunity, argue that tort 
 
23. As of May 1997, the district court had not yet determined whether the 
acts of the defendants had violated the UTPA. See Food Lion, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6962, at *28-29.  This determination must be made by the court as a matter 
of law. Hardy v. Toler, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (N.C.), cert. granted, 214 S.E.2d 431 
(N.C.), modified, 218 S.E.2d 342 (N.C. 1975). 
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16; see Peterson v. Bozzano, 183 B.R. 735 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 1995). 
25. See generally Robert M. O’Neil, Tainted Sources:  First Amendment Rights 
and Journalistic Wrongs, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1005 (1996); Sandra S. Baron et 
al., Tortious Interference:  The Limits of Common Law Liability for Newsgathering, 4 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1027 (1996); Jane E. Kirtley, Vanity and Vexation:  Shifting 
the Focus to Media Conduct, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1069 (1996); John J. Walsh et 
al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin:  The Constitutionality of Consequential 
Damages for Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1111 
(1996); Paul A. Lebel, The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News:  Toward a First 
Amendment Protection from Tort Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145 (1996). 
26. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for New Trial or 
Remittitur of Punitive Damage Award, Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., No. 92-00592 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
27. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Constitutional Law on Punitive Damages, Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 95-00513 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
   
394 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:389 
actions and large damage awards, such as those in Food Lion, 
chill the media’s ability to engage in investigative reporting 
necessary to bring important problems to the public’s atten-
tion.28  The media thus claim a special “watchdog” function 
in society which they feel has been vindicated by their his-
tory, and of which the First Amendment should take cogni-
zance.29  If they accept these arguments, courts might want 
to expressly acknowledge the constraints of the First 
Amendment on state tort law in a more forceful and unam-
biguous manner than would be achieved by merely leaving 
the media defendants to their BMW due process defense. 
BMW is, after all, merely a due process rule of general 
applicability,30 theoretically predicated on a low-tier, rational 
basis standard of review.31  While First Amendment con-
cerns might no doubt be factored into the first BMW in-
dicium of “reprehensibility,” query whether there should not 
be some separate and independent First Amendment immu-
nity principles recognized in this area.  Media defendants 
would point out that most of their tort-generated speech is 
entitled to high-tier First Amendment protection, requiring 
“compelling” government reasons for directly burdening the 
liberty, with the law “narrowly drawn” to achieve those 
ends.32  The minor newsgathering torts asserted to be neces-
sary to generate this speech should arguably be protected 
against excessive damage awards by something more than 
low-tier, “rational basis” due process. 
Moreover, BMW says nothing about the problem of ex-
cessive compensatory damage awards for newsgathering 
torts.  Indeed, Food Lion does not present this issue on appeal 
 
28. Id. at 13-14. 
29. Id. at 10-12. 
30. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1592-93 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
31. Under this standard, the government is required to show that the law is 
rationally-related to a valid or legitimate purpose.  See United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938). 
32. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). 
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because, at the trial level, Judge Tilley had rejected the plain-
tiff’s attempt to have the damages from publication consid-
ered by the jury as proximately caused by the newsgathering 
torts,33 and because the jury’s ultimate award of compensa-
tory damages for the torts proper was a modest one.34  It is 
nevertheless noteworthy that a higher award of compensa-
tory damages would in turn have reduced the “dispropora-
tionality” of the punitive damage award under BMW’s sec-
ond indicium.35 
Should the Fourth Circuit go beyond BMW and recon-
sider whether the media enjoys a First Amendment privi-
lege, or immunity from liability, for newsgathering torts, it 
might be useful to consider the following issues:  
 
33. Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822-24.  Including the damages from publica-
tion in the measurement of the damages for the predicate newsgathering torts, 
on a theory of proximate causation, receives some support in state common law 
decisions. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971); Bel-
luomo v. Kake TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832, 842 (Kan. App. 1979); Prahl v. 
Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 781-82 (Wis. 1980).  But see Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 
701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 
A.D.2d 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); see generally James F. King & Frederick T. 
Muto, Compensatory Damages for Newsgathering Torts:  Towards a Workable Stan-
dard, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919 (1981); Rex S. Heinke, Added Damages for Publica-
tion Should not be Available in Intrusion-Trespass Cases without Independent Justifica-
tion, 5 COMM. LAW. 1, 6 (1983). 
Food Lion had argued that such reputational damages should be recover-
able whether or not the publication was truthful. 887 F. Supp. at 822.  However, 
Judge Tilley accepted ABC’s argument, predicated on the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), “that a public figure cannot 
use a law of general applicability to recover reputation damages without estab-
lishing the strict requirements of a defamation claim.” 887 F. Supp. at 821.  Food 
Lion did not sue ABC for defamation, apparently asserting that the statute of 
limitations had run before it had gathered sufficient evidence to prove actual 
malice as required by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Singer, 
supra note 4, at 58.  Outside of court, however, Food Lion continues to contest the 
truthfulness of the PrimeTime Live broadcast, and asserts that it unsuccessfully 
attempted to add a libel claim to its lawsuit in 1995. Id. at 65.  ABC, in response, 
has challenged Food Lion to lift the “confidential” designation of  Food Lion’s 
internal documents that ABC obtained on discovery, and which it believes sup-
port the substantial truthfulness of its broadcast. Id. 
34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
35. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
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(1)  Which newsgathering torts would properly be in-
cluded within, and which would be excluded from, such a 
First Amendment privilege/immunity, and which would 
not; 
(2)  Whether the First Amendment privilege should ex-
tend to a complete immunity from civil liability for commis-
sion of these newsgathering torts, or whether immunity 
should be limited to excessive liability for the newsgathering 
torts, and if the latter, whether to excessive damages in any 
form—punitive, compensatory, or a combination thereof—or 
to punitive damages only; 
(3)  On what “conditions” might such an immunity, from 
either liability or excessive damages, be predicated; 
(4)  If the court chose to limit First Amendment protec-
tion to a ban on excessive punitive damages for newsgather-
ing torts, but under a standard more rigorous than the BMW 
due process rule, what factors might it weigh in assessing 
whether a specific punitive damage award is unconstitu-
tionally excessive in light of the First Amendment? 
Prominent in any discussion of a First Amendment im-
munity for newsgathering torts would be a comparison to 
First Amendment law limiting the recovery of civil tort 
damages for defamation36 in cases brought by public figures 
and public officials, or by others where the alleged defama-
tions related to matters of public concern, under the doctrine 
of New York Times v. Sullivan37 and its progeny.38  Indeed, 
this comparison might be made at more than one level.  For 
example, the newsgathering torts might be generally com-
pared to these constitutionalized categories of defamation to 
assess whether recognition of any First Amendment immu-
 
36. See, e.g., Baron,  supra note 25, at 1062; Lebel, supra note 25, at 1148-49. 
37. 376 U.S. 254  (1964). 
38. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dunn & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see also infra note 40 
and accompanying text (describing the Gertz and Greenmoss decisions). 
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nity for the media for the newsgathering torts might serve 
First Amendment interests of comparable significance. 
The issue of constitutionalized defamation would also 
arise because of the more specific concern that media targets 
like Food Lion are bringing newsgathering tort actions to 
circumvent the significant constitutional bulwarks erected 
by the Supreme Court in defamation cases.39  Food Lion did 
not sue ABC for defamation, apparently asserting that the 
statute of limitations had run before it had gathered suffi-
cient evidence to meet the proof of “actual malice” require-
ment of Sullivan.40  The suspicion that Food Lion was trying 
to circumvent the Sullivan requirements led Judge Tilley to 
reject the plaintiff’s argument that the measurement of dam-
ages for the newsgathering torts should include its reputa-
tional damages from ABC’s broadcast regardless of the truth 
or falsity thereof41—a decision which no doubt significantly 
reduced ABC’s compensatory damages.42 
 
39. See supra note 33 (discussing Sullivan and its progeny). 
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  In order to establish liability 
for defamation under the rule of Sullivan and its progeny, public officials and 
public figures must not only prove “actual malice”—defined as “knowledge of 
the falsity or reckless disregard of the truth,” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, but also 
must do so with clear and convincing clarity. Id. at 285-86. 
Non-Sullivan plaintiffs alleged to have been defamed as to matters of public 
concern bear the same burden of proof as to “actual malice” in order to recover 
presumed or punitive damages, but may otherwise recover provable special or 
general damages under state law standards which do not award injury without 
fault. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-50, as clarified by Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 757-61. 
Both Sullivan- and Gertz-type plaintiffs bear the burden of proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence on the issue of falsity. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986).  “Substantial truth” is a defense. Masson v. 
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1991). 
41. Food Lion, 887 F. Supp. at 822-24; see supra note 33 and accompanying 
text. 
42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  The ABC/PrimeTime Live 
broadcast apparently did have a devastating impact on Food Lion’s reputation:  
“Its stock lost almost half of its value in the year following the broadcast.  At 
least 88 stores were closed.  More than 1,000 employees were laid off.” Singer, 
supra note 4, at 58. 
On December 20, 1996, following a jury verdict finding the defendants liable 
for fraud, trespass, and breach of the duty of loyalty, Judge Tilley informed the 
parties that proof of damages resulting from “lost profits, lost sales, diminished 
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Such “anti-circumvention” analysis could be taken a sig-
nificant step further and argued as the basis for a general 
theory of First Amendment immunity from liability for mi-
nor newsgathering torts.  Perhaps the most significant 
statement of this position is that of the eminent Judge Rich-
ard A. Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in J.H. Desnick, 
M.D. Eye Service v. ABC,43 a case also involving ABC and 
PrimeTime Live:  
Today’s ‘tabloid’ style investigative television report-
age . . . is entitled to all the safeguards with which the 
Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defama-
tion.  And it is entitled to them regardless of the name 
of the tort, and, we add, regardless of whether the tort 
suit is aimed at the content of the broadcast or the 
production of the broadcast.  If the broadcast itself 
does not contain actionable defamation, and no estab-
lished rights are invaded in the process of creating it 
(for the media have no general immunity from tort or 
contract liability), then the target has no legal remedy 
even if the investigatory tactics used by the network 
are surreptitious, confrontational, unscrupulous, and 
ungentlemanly.44 
                                                                                                                                  
stock value or anything of that nature” would not be permitted. See Food Lion, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6962, at *5 n.2.  Judge Tilley gave his rationale for this rul-
ing in a memorandum opinion filed May 9, 1997. Id.  His theory was that, under 
the applicable laws of North Carolina and South Carolina, such “publication 
damages” could not be viewed as directly attributable to, and therefore proxi-
mately caused by, the defendants’ torts. Id.  Judge Tilley avoided the question of 
whether such recovery might be barred by the First Amendment. 
43. 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). 
44. Id. at 1355 (citations omitted).  Judge Posner’s quoted remarks regarding 
the First Amendment are arguably dicta in Desnick, because the Seventh Circuit 
had previously concluded therein that the media defendants had not committed 
the alleged common law torts of trespass, privacy invasion and fraud, nor had 
they violated the relevant federal or state statutes limiting electronic surveillance 
by having individuals with hidden cameras pose as patients requesting eye ex-
aminations at defendant’s ophthalmic centers specializing in cataract surgery. Id. 
at 1351-55. 
Critical to the holding in Desnick that no newsgathering torts had been 
committed was Judge Posner’s conclusion that the media’s inducement of the 
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It is hoped that this Symposium panel, Accountability of 
the Media in Investigations, will give us valuable insights into 
these constitutional and other legal issues that will confront 
the Fourth Circuit in the Food Lion appeal, as well as other 
judges and federal and state legislators in the years to come. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
target’s consent through fraud or misrepresentation might not always negate 
that consent. Id. at 1351.  Notably, Judge Tilley, in denying ABC’s motion for 
summary judgment in Food Lion, thought Desnick to be distinguishable, in this 
regard, on its facts. Unlike the eye examination offices in Desnick, to which any-
one expressing a desire for ophthalmic services had access, Food Lion had al-
lowed the PrimeTime Live reporters access to areas to which only its employees 
had access.  These reporters, Tilley concluded, were really ABC employees, and a 
reasonable jury might find that their presence at Food Lion was purely incidental 
to their jobs with PrimeTime Live. Food Lion, 951 F. Supp. at 1222-24. 
The approach of Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit in Desnick, in effect 
reading the common law torts “small” by reinterpreting ancient forms of action 
so as to free the media from liability for non-criminal newsgathering torts, might 
provide an additional option for the Fourth Circuit in considering the Food Lion 
appeal. 
